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NOTES
REJECTING  THE  DE  MINIMIS  DEFENSE
TO  INFRINGEMENT  OF  SOUND
RECORDING COPYRIGHTS
Michael G. Kubik*
INTRODUCTION
“Get a license or do not sample.”1  The Sixth Circuit’s terse ultimatum in
the 2005 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films decision rejected the com-
mon law de minimis2 exception to copying as applied to sound recordings,
and for eleven years, Bridgeport stood unchallenged by the courts of appeals,
the Supreme Court, and Congress.3  This changed in June 2016 with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone.4  Confronted with
the question of whether the de minimis defense applies to the unauthorized
copying of sound recordings, the court openly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning and held that the de minimis defense applies.5  In doing so, the
Ninth Circuit created a circuit split subjecting two centers of the American
music industry, Nashville (Sixth Circuit) and Los Angeles (Ninth Circuit), to
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts,
Honors in Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor
Stephen Yelderman for his invaluable guidance throughout writing this Note.  I would also
like to thank my Notre Dame Law Review colleagues for their revisions.
1 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
2 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“‘[D]e minimis non curat lex’ (sometimes rendered, ‘the law does not concern itself with
trifles’).”).
3 During that time, however, several district courts and scholars criticized Bridgeport’s
holding. See infra note 84.  Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress have addressed
Bridgeport’s rejection of the de minimis exception.
4 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
5 Id. at 886.
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inconsistent copyright protection regimes.6  In the interest of consistency
and predictability in the law, this split must be resolved.
Part I of this Note examines the history of sound recording copyrights,
the role of digital sampling in the music industry, and the basic principles
and functions of the de minimis defense.  Part II carefully dissects the
Bridgeport and VMG opinions.  Part III then considers the merits of each opin-
ion and concludes that Bridgeport reached the correct conclusion.  This argu-
ment rests on the statutory scheme of Title 17 of the U.S. Code and the plain
text of its applicable provisions, bolstered by their legislative history, giving
life to a unique statutory creature that thrives in a manner inconsistent with
traditional theories of copyright law.  In essence, (1) sound recording copy-
rights protect only the form of the substance protected by underlying musical
work copyrights; (2) the de minimis inquiry focuses solely on the substance
of a given work; (3) therefore, the formal protection afforded by sound
recording copyrights should be excluded from the de minimis inquiry.
I. BACKGROUND
Resolving the circuit split demands an understanding of the intersection
of sound recording copyrights, digital sampling in the music industry,7 and
the common law de minimis defense in the heavily statutory field of copy-
right law.8  To this end, we will begin with an examination of each.
A. Sound Recording Copyrights
“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . .”9  When a playwright scribbles
his notes in his journal, when a painter brings his brush to the canvas, when a
photographer emerges from the darkroom with picture in hand, their work
6 See id. at 889–90 (Silverman, J., dissenting).  The VMG court acknowledged and
weighed the “particularly troublesome” consequences of its disagreement. See id. at 886
(majority opinion) (“‘Creating inconsistent rules among the circuits would lead to differ-
ent levels of protection in different areas of the country, even if the same alleged infringe-
ment is occurring nationwide.’ . . . But the goal of avoiding a circuit split cannot override
our independent duty to determine congressional intent.” (quoting Seven Arts Filmed
Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013))).
7 It is worth noting that while this Note specifically addresses sound recording
infringement in the digital sampling context, sound recording copyrights are not limited
to musical works. See infra Section I.A.
8 See generally 17 U.S.C. (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)
(“[C]opyright legislation . . . is not based upon any natural right . . . [but] such rights as
[the rights holder] has are purely statutory rights.”); David E. Shipley, Droit de Suite, Copy-
right’s First Sale Doctrine and Preemption of State Law, 39 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 11
(2017) (discussing Title 17’s preemption provision, § 301, as “reflect[ing] congressional
intent to preempt and abolish . . . any rights under common law” equivalent to the rights
codified in Title 17).
9 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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is protected by the provisions of Title 17 of the U.S. Code.  Each of these
works—the notes, the painting, and the photograph—embody a single copy-
right carrying, where applicable, the exclusive rights expressed in
§ 106(1)–(6).  These are the rights of reproduction,10 adaptation,11 distribu-
tion,12 public performance,13 and public display.14  When a musician writes
and records a song, however, she acquires two distinct yet related copyrights:
one for the underlying musical work and one for the sound recording.15
While the musical work copyright covers the substantive elements of the
song, such as the lyrics, rhythm, tempo, and arrangement of notes,16 the
sound recording copyright covers the actual sounds embodied in the record-
ing.  As defined in § 101, “ ‘[s]ound recordings’ are works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.”17  Simply put,
the sound recording copyright extends to the actual sounds you hear when
you press “play.”
Prior to 1971, musicians only retained a copyright in a song’s underlying
musical work and thereby had no recourse for unauthorized duplication of
their sound recordings by lawful users of that work.  While sound recording
technology has existed since at least 1860,18 it was not until the introduction
10 Id. § 106(1) (granting the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords”).
11 Id. § 106(2) (granting the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work”).
12 Id. § 106(3) (granting the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership”).
13 Id. § 106(4) (for certain enumerated categories of works, granting the right “to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly”).
14 Id. § 106(5) (for certain enumerated categories of works, granting the right “to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly”).  Sound recordings are also granted a specific exclu-
sive right “to perform . . . publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” Id. § 106(6).
15 See id. § 102(a)(2), (a)(7) (enumerating both “musical works” and “sound record-
ings” as copyrightable subject matter); see also Jennifer Leigh Pridgeon, Note, The Perform-
ance Rights Act and American Participation in International Copyright Protection, 17 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 417, 420 (2010) (tracing bifurcation of rights to 1908 case White-Smith Music
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)).
16 Courts have examined a variety of compositional elements in determining the
bounds of a musical work copyright. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d
477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (lyrics, rhythm, pitch, cadence, relationship between verse and
chorus); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (phrasing, rhythms, “melodic
contours,” lyrics, melodies, structures, chord progressions); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d
539, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (structure, melody, harmony, rhythm).  Courts are quick to clarify
that music is not a medium that lends itself to precise definitions and enumerated ele-
ments, and therefore, the relevant elements of a musical composition in a given case
should not be taken as exhaustive. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[N]o one magical combination of these factors . . . will automatically substantiate a musi-
cal infringement suit.”).
17 17 U.S.C. § 101.
18 See Danielle Ely, Comment, We Can Work It Out: Why Full Federalization of Pre-1972
Sound Recordings Is Necessary to Clarify Ambiguous and Inconsistent State Copyright Laws, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 737, 740 (2016).
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of magnetic tape in the mid-twentieth century that it became commercially
viable to market recording technology to a broad consumer base.19  This
accessibility allowed any individual to quickly and cheaply create high fidelity
copies of songs, and thus led to a massive influx of pirated material on the
market.20  Because the copyright laws at the time only protected underlying
musical works, duplication of recordings avoided infringing the copyright,
provided that the copyist paid the nominal compulsory license fee for the
musical work.21  It did not take Congress long to notice the substantially
damaging potential of record piracy.
In 1971, Congress officially recognized sound recordings as copyright-
able subject matter with the passage of the Sound Recording Act (SRA).22
With the stated purpose of creating a “limited copyright in sound recordings
for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of
sound recording,”23 the SRA gave owners of the copyright the right to
“reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship . . . reproductions of the copyrighted work.”24  The Act then further
defined the reproduction right as “the right to duplicate the sound recording
in a tangible form that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds
fixed in the recording” and provided specifically that “this right does not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that is an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”25  To illustrate, consider
a cassette tape with a solo acoustic guitar track.  Under the SRA, a copyist
would infringe the sound recording copyright by directly recording the play-
back of the tape (imagine holding a microphone up to a speaker, for
instance).  The copyist would avoid infringement, however, if she were to
make a recording of herself playing the guitar, even if her performance per-
fectly mimics the original cassette.  So long as the actual sounds of the record-
ing are not reproduced, there is no infringement.26
19 See Steven L. Sparkman, Tape Pirates: The New “Buck”-aneer$, 21 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
98, 104 (1971).
20 See id. at 104–05 (estimating between one-third and one-half of all tapes sold nation-
wide were pirated copies); see also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intel-
lectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (noting that during the “era of tape piracy in the late 1960s
. . . ‘pirates’ inundated the Copyright Office with notices of intention, many of which
contained hundreds of song titles”).
21 See Sparkman, supra note 19, at 106; see also S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 4 (1971).
22 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.  Congress originally planned
to introduce sound recordings into the copyright laws through a general revision of Title
17, but the widespread pirate activity necessitated acting on this specific provision before
waiting for the whole revision to pass. See S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 3–4.
23 85 Stat. at 391.
24 Id. § 1(a).
25 Id.
26 Bear in mind that the same categorical exception does not apply to the underlying
musical work copyright.  Thus, while a copyist may avoid infringement of the sound record-
ing copyright, she very well may infringe the underlying musical work.
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Five years after the SRA, Congress passed a complete overhaul of the
copyright laws with the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”).27  While the Act
did many things, of relevance to our discussion is its incorporation of the
SRA into the new § 114 titled “Scope of exclusive rights in sound record-
ings.”28  As its name implies, this section defines the boundaries of the exclu-
sive rights in sound recordings granted by § 106.  The 1976 Act structured
Title 17 so that copyrightable subject matter is defined in § 102, the exclusive
rights afforded to that subject matter are given generally in § 106, and then
§ 106 expressly limits those exclusive rights by the applicable provisions in
(what are now) §§ 107–122.29  Consistent with the definitions and bounda-
ries in the SRA, sound recordings are defined in § 101,30 recognized as copy-
rightable subject matter in § 102(a)(7), granted the broad suite of exclusive
rights in § 106.  Section 114 then pulls back on those exclusive rights to set
clear limits.
Principally, § 114 limits the exclusive rights in sound recordings to
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and, after 1995, public performance
via digital audio transmission.31  While the adaptation right was a new expan-
sion, the 1976 Act largely transplanted the language of the SRA in defining
the scope of the reproduction right, primarily only making technical changes
to its language to conform to the new statutory structure.32  Importantly, the
1976 Act retained the independent fixation infringement exception, but with
slightly altered language.  Where the SRA provided that “the making or
duplication of another sound recording that is an independent fixation of
other sounds”33 did not infringe the reproduction right, the 1976 Act
phrased it as “the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds.”34  While § 114
has undergone significant revision since the passage of the 1976 Act, none of
the section’s nine amendments have altered the independent fixation excep-
27 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
28 Id. § 114.
29 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 107–22 (2012).
30 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336.  Note that the SRA only provided for the rights of reproduction and distribu-
tion, not adaptation. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32 For instance, where the SRA provided that the “exclusive right of the owner of a
copyright in a sound recording to reproduce it is limited to the right to duplicate the sound
recording in a tangible form that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in
the recording,” and excluded “sounds accompanying a motion picture,” from the defini-
tion of sound recordings.  Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(a), (e), 85. Stat.
391, 391 (emphasis added).  The 1976 Act replaced “to reproduce it” with “under clause
(1) of section 106” and “in a tangible form” with “in the form of phonorecords, or of
copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual works.” Id. § 114(b).
33 Id. § 1(a).
34 Id. § 114(b) (emphasis added).  The 1976 Act applied this exception to both the
reproduction and adaptation rights. Id.
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tion of § 114(b).35  Thus, the previous guitar player example still holds true:
so long as the actual sounds of the recording are not recaptured, the copyist
does not infringe the sound recording copyright.
Understanding the legal concept of the sound recording copyright, let
us now briefly examine its most common factual application—digital
sampling.
B. Digital Sampling
Sampling, perhaps most prevalent in the rap and hip-hop genres, refers
to the act of copying and transplanting segments of an existing recording
into a new song.36  The range and motivation of use covers everything from
forming the new song entirely around a distinctive looped sample—as in
Eminem’s loop of the bassline in Labi Siffre’s I Got The . . .37 in My Name Is38
or Kanye West’s loop of a vocal segment of Daft Punk’s Harder, Better, Faster,
Stronger39 in Stronger40—to adding embellishments with quick, isolated seg-
35 See 109 Stat. 336 (adding digital transmission performance right to § 106(6) and
setting distinct limits in § 114); Act of Nov. 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111 Stat. 1529
(modifying licensing language in § 114(f)); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (modifying licensing scheme in § 114(d)); Small Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (modifying and adding settle-
ment and royalty payment language in § 114(f) and (g)); Copyright Royalty and Distribu-
tion Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (modifying § 114(f) to
conform with other changes to Title 17 involving replacing copyright arbitration royalty
panels with Copyright Royalty Judges); Copyright Royalty Judges Program Technical Cor-
rections Act, Pub. L. No. 109-303, 120 Stat. 1478 (2006) (making conforming technical
changes in § 114(f) reflecting other changes throughout Title 17 related to Copyright Roy-
alty Judges); Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (modi-
fying § 114(f) to provide for agreements for the reproduction and performance of sound
recordings by webcasters); Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat.
1926 (further modifying § 114(f) settlement language); Copyright Cleanup, Clarification,
and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-295, 124 Stat. 3180 (making grammatical and
other conforming changes to § 114).  In the forty-five years since passing the SRA, Con-
gress has only modified the independent fixation exception once, and that was the 1976
Act’s expansion of the exception to both the reproduction and adaptation rights.  It is also
worth noting that four of these amendments were enacted after the Bridgeport decision.
36 See Stephen R. Wilson, Note, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples
Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 179 (2002).  Sampling is distinct from
“covering” a song in that sampling involves employing the actual audio (albeit often
manipulated in speed or other effect) whereas the traditional cover song simply mimics or
evokes the original composition. See id. at 181; see also REEL BIG FISH, Take on Me, on
BASEKETBALL (Mojo 1998) (ska cover of 1980s synth-pop song Take on Me, A-HA, Take on
Me, on HUNTING HIGH AND LOW (Warner Bros. 1984)).
37 LABI SIFFRE, I Got the . . ., on REMEMBER MY SONG (EMI 1975).
38 EMINEM, My Name Is, on THE SLIM SHADY LP (Interscope 1999).
39 DAFT PUNK, Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger, on DISCOVERY (Virgin 2001).
40 KANYE WEST, Stronger, on GRADUATION (Def Jam 2007).
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ments—as in the approximately two-second military vocalization sound effect
that opens Kanye West’s Jesus Walks.41
Artists can evoke older songs through sampling and thereby comment
on the original or add their own personal touch, but of primary value is the
substantially reduced investment in time, labor, and capital afforded by sam-
pling.42  For example, if a rapper wants to loop a particular, recognizable
guitar riff as the main section of his song, he can either play and record the
riff himself, hire a session musician to play the riff, or just rip the riff directly
from the original recording.  In the first two instances, substantial time will
go into ensuring that the timing and tone of the riff match the original; that
time will be spent in a studio, which must be paid for.  If the rapper does not
play guitar, he will have to pay the session musician for his time; he will likely
need to pay a separate audio engineer to properly set up the microphones
and other equipment; and a producer must be paid to mix the audio.
Recording an original work is an expensive, time consuming, and labor-
intensive process.  The appeal of digital sampling is therefore easy to under-
stand.  Why incur all those costs when they can be avoided with a ninety-nine
cent MP3 file and a basic understanding of how to split an audio file?  Sam-
pling makes sense, both artistically and financially.  Let us now turn to how
the law complicates it.
C. Substantial Similarity and the De Minimis Copy
In actions for infringement where the plaintiff alleges unauthorized cop-
ying, courts typically employ a two-step test to determine liability: (1) was
there actual copying and (2) was the copying so “far as to constitute
improper appropriation.”43  The first prong looks to both direct evidence,
such as a defendant’s admission, and indirect evidence, such as a defendant’s
access to the original work and the degree of similarity between the alleged
copy and the original.44  If the plaintiff carries the burden for the first prong,
the second prong then requires demonstrating what many courts call “sub-
stantial similarity” to the protectable elements of the original work.45  In the
41 KANYE WEST, Jesus Walks, on THE COLLEGE DROPOUT (Def Jam 2004) (sampling
AUTHENTIC SOUND EFFECTS, Manual of Arms, on AUTHENTIC SOUND EFFECTS VOL. 3 (Elektra
1987)).
42 See Wilson, supra note 36, at 179 n.9.
43 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
44 Id. Note that the similarity analysis in the first prong is different than the substan-
tial similarity analysis in the second prong.  Substantial similarity as indirect evidence of
actual copying centers on the objective similarities between the original and alleged
copy—for instance, whether two musical works use the same notes and rhythm. See Three
Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
45 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (holding
that infringement requires “copying of constituent elements of the work that are origi-
nal”); Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (ruling that plaintiff
must show “substantial similarity between legally [protectable] elements.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 2002)));
Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that substantial similarity must
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context of musical works, substantial similarity turns on “whether defendant
took . . . so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise
the audience for whom such popular music is composed.”46  In essence, the
substantial similarity standard queries whether the relevant audience would
recognize the copied elements as deriving from the original work.  Herein
lies the de minimis inquiry.
The de minimis inquiry is the other side of the substantial similarity
coin.  Once a plaintiff demonstrates actual copying, the question becomes
whether the defendant copied “to such a trivial extent as to fall below the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity.”47  Thus, a defendant has a
successful de minimis defense when, despite the plaintiff’s successful showing
of actual copying, the plaintiff cannot carry the burden of demonstrating
substantial similarity.  The substantial similarity, and therefore de minimis,
inquiry varies depending on the category of work, however.48  The tradi-
tional de minimis analysis in the musical work context simply asks whether
the plaintiff demonstrated substantial similarity with reference to the lay
hearer.49  If the lay audience would recognize the copied elements as deriv-
ing from the protectable elements of the original work, the de minimis
exception does not apply and, absent another exception, the defendant will
be held liable for infringement.
As a final note before our discussion of Bridgeport and VMG, the de
minimis exception is a common-law rule.50  The strict language of Title 17
does not invoke the de minimis test.  As Congress has not expressly approved
or denied the rule, the boundaries of de minimis are subject only to the
decisions of the courts.  It is with this historical backdrop that the Bridgeport
and VMG courts announced their rules.  Let us now examine their
arguments.
be shown between protected elements); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.
2004); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997); Gottlieb
Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); cf. Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (ruling that similarities
must be in expression, not abstract idea).  Different courts tend to use inconsistent or
otherwise vague and confusing language, but, as the Seventh Circuit notes, they all hinge
on showing that “the defendant had an actual opportunity to copy the original . . . and that
the two works share enough unique features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy
another’s work.”  Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633–34 (7th Cir. 2012).
46 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; accord Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (employing “average audi-
ence” standard).  The Arnstein court explained its use of the lay listener in terms of protect-
ing the artist’s “interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which
derive from the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.” Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
47 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74.
48 For instance, in the context of visual works, it may be the case that the entire work
was copied but the use was nonetheless not infringing.  This was exactly the case in Gottlieb:
the entirety of a copyrighted pinball machine design appeared in a movie, but the use was
still de minimis. Gottlieb, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 631–32.
49 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (“[A] use is de minimis only if the average audience would
not recognize the appropriation.”).
50 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Bridgeport and VMG came to contrary conclusions in deciding whether
the de minimis exception applies in the case of sound recordings.  This Part
will examine each case and lay out the rationale behind their holdings.  Part
III will then assess the merits of each case and propose a resolution consistent
with Bridgeport’s holding based on the operative text of the statute and the
unique nature of sound recording copyrights.
A. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films
The dispute in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films51 centered on the
unauthorized sampling of plaintiffs Bridgeport Music and Westbound
Records’ song Get Off Your Ass and Jam52 in the song 100 Miles and Runnin’,53
which in turn was featured in the movie I Got the Hook Up54 and its accompa-
nying soundtrack.55  The lower court found only de minimis copying and
therefore granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs.56  The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed the decision.57
The particular sample at issue was the introduction to Get Off Your Ass
and Jam, a four-second unaccompanied guitar riff.58  The riff was a rapidly
repeated arpeggiated chord, that is, a series of notes played one by one that
comprise a single chord.59  As the district court characterized it, the rapid
arpeggiation created a distinctive “high-pitched, whirling sound that captures
the listener’s attention and creates anticipation of what is to follow.”60 100
51 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
52 FUNKADELIC, Get Off Your Ass and Jam, on LET’S TAKE IT TO THE STAGE (Westbound
1975).
53 N.W.A., 100 Miles and Runnin’, on 100 MILES AND RUNNIN’ (Ruthless Records 1990).
54 I GOT THE HOOK UP (Dimension Films 1998).
55 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
56 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn.
2002), rev’d, 410 F.3d 792.
57 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
58 See id. at 796.
59 See Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.  For instance, the G Major chord consists of
the notes G, B, and D, so arpeggiating the G Major chord means playing G, B, and D in
succession rather than simultaneously. See, e.g., Kathy Dickson, Eight Things You Need to
Know About Arpeggios, GUITAR WORLD (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.guitarworld.com/les-
sons/guitar-tricks-eight-things-you-need-know-about-arpeggios.
60 Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.  While arpeggiation is a standard musical tech-
nique, the district court found the particular aural qualities and effects of the riff were
sufficient to defeat summary judgment for lack of originality. Id.  It is worth noting at this
point that the Nimmer treatise, on which VMG placed great weight, criticizes Bridgeport for
failing to perform an originality inquiry and thereby “adopting a categorical rule that all
two-second snippets, if sampled, lead to liability.”  4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][b] n.114.21 (2017) [hereinafter NIMMER].  This is an
uncharitable reading of Bridgeport.  The procedural posture of the case was such that sum-
mary judgment for lack of originality was denied and not renewed on appeal. Bridgeport,
410 F.3d at 797.  The court therefore had no occasion to inquire into originality.  One is
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Miles and Runnin’ sampled a two-second segment from the solo, lowered its
pitch, looped it for sixteen beats (approximately seven seconds), and
inserted it at five different points throughout the song.61  While the district
court held that the differences were significant enough to support a finding
that a lay audience would not have recognized the appropriation,62 the Sixth
Circuit’s new test precluded that question from being asked.63
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning rests primarily on its construction of Title
17, specifically the interplay between §§ 106 and 114.64  The core of the stat-
utory analysis began with a consideration of the purpose and history of copy-
right law in the United States.  Noting that the laws aim to both promote
creativity and protect original works, the court found § 114(b)’s right to
duplicate through direct or indirect recapturing of the sound recording’s
actual sounds to strike the appropriate balance.65  Anyone may imitate—
even perfectly—the sound recording and thereby benefit from its creative
value, but the fixed sounds themselves—i.e., the artist’s actual product––are
protected by the copyright monopoly.66  In further defining the bounds of
that monopoly, the court took special notice of the 1976 Act’s addition of the
word “entirely” to § 114(b)’s independent fixation exception67 and con-
cluded that the exception grants the owner of a sound recording copyright
“the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”68  The plain text of the
§ 114(b) exception then effectively precludes a de minimis inquiry.69
Explaining the policy judgment behind this interpretation, the Sixth Cir-
cuit pointed to ease of enforcement, the ability of markets to control licens-
ing fees, and the necessarily intentional nature of sampling.70  First, as to
ease of enforcement, the independent fixation exception sets a simple
bright-line rule: “[g]et a license or do not sample.”71  Section 114 extends
liable for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) only for violations of
the rights enumerated in §§ 106–122 or § 602, rights which depend on the underlying
work satisfying the subject matter requirements of § 102(a), one of which is originality.
Nimmer raises valuable questions about the Sixth Circuit’s decision, but to accuse it of
setting a test that would impose liability without regard for the basic requirements of
copyrightability goes too far, especially where the court demonstrated such a thorough
assessment of the statutory language.
61 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796.
62 See Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
63 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798–99.
64 Id. at 799.
65 Id. at 800.
66 Id.
67 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
68 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
69 The Bridgeport court declined to consider the legislative history of the SRA or the
1976 Act on the basis that “digital sampling wasn’t being done in 1971.” Id. at 805.  I agree
with the VMG court that the Sixth Circuit was wrong to ignore legislative history, VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 2016), and I fully treat the issue infra
Section III.A.
70 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
71 Id.
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the sound recording copyright to reproduction and adaptation under § 106
and then carves out a special exception for independent fixation; by its plain
terms, § 114 shields simulation, but punishes unauthorized direct or indirect
copying.  Where the unpredictability of a jury’s assessment of substantial simi-
larity may deter artists and producers—as potential future litigants—from
making creative uses of another’s sound recording,72 this bright-line rule
would allow them to model their behavior based on the predictability of the
rule.73
Second, this rule would lead to an efficient market for licenses.  Because
samplers may lawfully simulate a sound recording, parties can bargain for the
actual value of the sample.  A sampler will thus only seek a license that costs
less than the cost of simulating the sound independently.74  Rather than
allow licensors to exercise undue control over the price of the license, market
pressure would force them to set a price at or near the value the sampler
assigns to the sound recording.  This increases the overall utility of the
license market by allowing licensors to continue realizing the economic
potential of their creative works while also allowing samplers to incorporate
the remaining creative value of those works into their own creations at a cost
reflecting their assigned value to the recording.75
72 See id. at 802 n.15 (“A cost-benefit analysis generally indicates that is [sic] is less
expensive for a sampler to purchase a license before sampling . . . rather than take his
chances in an expensive trial, the outcome of which . . . is nearly impossible to predict with
any degree of certainty.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Wilson, supra note 36, at
188 n.97)).
73 As the court noted, a bright-line rule would not inhibit a sampler’s future creative
use of an artist’s sound recording because the sampler is still free to imitate the recording
if he does not want to seek a license or a license is refused. Id. at 801.  The court also
considered the beneficial impact of a bright-line rule on judicial economy. Id. at 802.
Predictability of the rule not only benefits potential litigants ex ante by clearly delineating
lawful and unlawful conduct, but also can make litigation more efficient by making the ex
post analysis simpler.  Rather than mire the trier of fact in the “gymnastics” of a substantial
similarity analysis, the question becomes solely whether or not actual copying took place.
Id.  This has the additional benefit of preventing expert testimony on the objective prong
of the substantial similarity analysis from unduly influencing the trier of fact during the
subjective analysis phase. See, e.g., Jeremy Aregood, Note, Blurring the Line: An Examination
of Technological Fact-Finding in Music Copyright Law, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
115, 123–25 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of separating forensic evidence of similarity
for actual copying from the subjective impressions on the trier of fact central to the second
prong of the substantial similarity analysis).  The Sixth Circuit made clear, however, that
judicial economy is only an ancillary consideration and not dispositive. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d
at 802.  On the other hand, the economic impacts on the music industry, particularly with
regard to the market for licenses, did play a role in the court’s decision. See id.
74 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
75 The Bridgeport court, in further supporting its announcement of a new rule, placed
a degree of emphasis on the fact that many, if not most, samplers seek licenses “as a matter
of course.” Id. at 804; see also id. at 804 n.19 (quoting A. Dean Johnson, Comment, Music
Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 163 (1993)) (discussing the development of sampling clearing-
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Finally, this bright-line rule reflects a policy against permitting willful
appropriation of another’s creative pursuits.  As the Sixth Circuit stated,
“sampling is never accidental.”76  Sampling is a deliberate choice—a sampler
cannot accidentally take a portion of a sound recording as a composer can
subconsciously incorporate another musician’s melody into his own.  A sam-
pler must seek out and choose a particular preexisting sound recording,
determine which portion of that recording best fits the new work, and then
directly reproduce that work by taking from the original recording.  Samplers
“know [they] are taking another’s work product.”77  The court went so far as
to claim that sampling amounts to a physical taking from the copyright
holder—that the sampler takes “something of value,”78 even when the sam-
ple is small.79  As the court explained, the thing sampled is not just the
underlying song, but the actual fixed sounds—samplers take from the fixed,
physical medium.80  That Congress expressly carved out an exception for
independently fixed imitations further militates against permitting de
minimis takings of the copyright holder’s work.  The independent fixation
exception creates a particularized instance wherein unauthorized use of the
work is lawful, but that lawfulness depends entirely on the use of the work
being an independent fixation.  The reproduction and adaptation rights
reserved by statute to the copyright holder thus stand against any taking not
in accordance with the accompanying statutory exception.81
Bridgeport’s rejection of the de minimis defense was dictated by statute
and reinforced by policy.  Section 114 provides that a reproduction consist-
ing entirely of independently fixed sounds is lawful; therefore, a reproduc-
tion not consisting entirely of independently fixed sounds does not fall within
houses and the growing trend of publishers instituting licensing policies to more efficiently
handle the high number of requests for licensed samples).
76 Id. at 801.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 802 & n.14 (quoting Christopher D. Abramson, Note, Digital Sampling and
the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667–68
(1999)) (noting that by appropriating another musician’s work, sampling avoids the cost of
hiring musicians but still reaps the benefit of a live musician’s sound).
79 See id. at 801–02.
80 See id. at 802.
81 While the Bridgeport court foreclosed application of the de minimis defense, it
expressly left open the question of whether a fair use defense may apply. Id. at 805.  Espe-
cially considering that 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) codifies the fair use defense and is one of the
clawback provisions noted in § 106, it would seem consistent with Bridgeport to allow fair
use defenses. Bridgeport denied the injection of an uncodified common law defense; its
analysis does not evince an intent to abrogate other statutory provisions. Cf. Barre´ v.
Carter, 272 F. Supp. 3d 906, 930 (E.D. La. 2017) (noting both that Bridgeport left the appli-
cability of a fair use defense open and that nothing in § 107 suggests it does not extend to
digital sampling).  Further, while § 107 does account for the “amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” this is only one factor that
must be balanced against the others.  17 U.S.C. § 107.  Thus, closing the door on the de
minimis inquiry with respect to substantial similarity infringement does not close the door
on fair use because of its de minimis–type factor.
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the exception and infringes the copyright.  This bright-line rule carries the
additional benefits of easy enforcement and predictability of the law, encour-
aging an efficient market for licenses, and addressing the necessarily inten-
tional taking inherent in digital sampling.
This decision has drawn considerable criticism among scholars.82  Much
of this centers on the negative policy effects of the bright-line rule and its
potential impact on future creativity.83  Several publications, prescient of
VMG, also take particular issue with the court’s choice to ignore legislative
history, often pointing to a House Report suggesting that § 114 contemplates
a substantial similarity test.84  As Section III.A covers, however, courts and
scholars have been underinclusive in their consideration of the legislative
history—a more thorough examination reveals that Bridgeport’s holding actu-
ally better comports with congressional intent.
Despite the widespread scholarship against Bridgeport, the decision went
unchallenged by the other courts of appeals for eleven years.85  Then, in
2016, the Ninth Circuit gave new life to the de minimis defense in VMG.
B. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone
The VMG court rejected Bridgeport’s holding and renewed the de
minimis defense to infringement of sound recording copyrights.86  There,
the plaintiff argued that Madonna and her producer, Shep Pettibone, sam-
pled without authorization a “horn hit” section from the song Ooh, I Love It
(Love Break)87 (“Love Break”), used it in two commercial versions of
82 See, e.g., John Schietinger, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the
Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 230–34 (2005)
(arguing that rejecting the de minimis defense is inconsistent with the defense’s broad
applicability in copyright law and nothing in the caselaw or the statute precludes the
defense); M. Leah Somoano, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: Has Unli-
censed Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 289, 302–06 (2006) (arguing that Bridgeport “is contrary to legislative history and unjus-
tifiably departs from the well-established doctrine of de minimis”). But see Tracy L. Reilly,
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music
Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 355 (2008) (defending the Bridgeport decision).
83 See, e.g., Christopher Weldon, Note, The De Minimis Requirement as a Safety Valve:
Copyright, Creativity, and the Sampling of Sound Recordings, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1261, 1273–78
(2017) (noting that Bridgeport’s bright-line rule has led to greater risk aversion among
record labels and created a “clearance culture at times border[ing] on the absurd”).
84 See, e.g., Daniel Esannason, Note, Get a License or Don’t Sample: Using Examples from
Popular Music to Raise New Questions About the Bridgeport v. Dimension Films Holding, 29
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 551, 559–60 (2016); Somoano, supra note 82, at 304–05; see also infra
notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
85 Note that several district courts have declined to follow the bright-line Bridgeport
rule. See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016) (collecting
cases).
86 Id. at 874.
87 THE SALSOUL ORCHESTRA, Ooh, I Love It (Love Break), on OOH, I LOVE IT (LOVE
BREAK) (Salsoul Records 1983).  VMG’s predecessor hired Pettibone in the early 1980s to
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Madonna’s hit song Vogue,88 and thereby infringed both the musical work
and sound recording copyrights held by VMG.89  The district court declined
to follow Bridgeport and held instead that infringement of sound recording
copyrights warrants a substantial similarity and de minimis analysis.90  The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the
defendant’s favor.91
The sample at issue was a single 0.23-second horn hit chord from Love
Break.92 Love Break uses the horn hit throughout the song as both a single
quarter-note hit and a quick succession of an eighth-note hit followed by a
quarter-note hit.93 Vogue also uses the single- and double-hit setup, but Petti-
bone’s sample transposed the chord up a half step—that is, the sample
appears in Vogue at a slightly higher pitch than the original.94  The radio edit
version of Vogue uses the single hit once and the double hit three times,
whereas the longer compilation version uses the single hit once and the
double hit five times.95  The Ninth Circuit held that because Pettibone sam-
pled less than a second of the original recording, the sample appeared very
few times in Vogue, and the sample altered the original sound, a reasonable
juror would not recognize the Vogue horn hits as being sampled from Love
Break, and the use was therefore de minimis.96
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Bridgeport rests on its contrary interpre-
tation of Title 17’s applicable provisions, in turn based on the statutory
scheme, the plain language of the statute, and the legislative history of the
remix several compositions, Love Break being one such result.  VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Cic-
cone, No. CV 12-05967, 2013 WL 8600435, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).  The parties
disputed the proper ownership of the copyrights to the song, and while VMG asserted
ownership through a work for hire agreement, see id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining
“work made for hire”), the district court declined to rule on the issue because its finding
that the sampled portion lacked originality made ownership irrelevant. VMG, 2013 WL
8600435, at *6–7; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(ruling that copyright infringement requires showing both ownership of the copyright and
unauthorized copying of original elements of the work).
88 MADONNA, Vogue, on I’M BREATHLESS (Warner Bros. 1990).
89 VMG, 824 F.3d at 875.
90 VMG, 2013 WL 8600435, at *9–10.  The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants on two alternative grounds: either the composition and sound recording of
the horn hit lacked originality, or, even if the plaintiff demonstrated originality, the sample
was a de minimis use. Id. at *6, *12.
91 VMG, 824 F.3d at 874.
92 Id. at 875.
93 Id.  Love Break uses the single hit twenty-seven times and the double hit twenty-three
times. Id.
94 Id. at 875–76, 875 n.3.  The sample also modified the original waveform of the horn
hit by altering its dynamic qualities to make it “punchier” and by overlaying other sounds
and effects. Id. at 879.
95 Id. at 876.
96 Id. at 880.  Of note, one of VMG’s experts, a “highly qualified and trained musi-
cian,” was unable at first to accurately discern which parts of Love Break were sampled and
incorporated into Vogue. Id. As the court remarked, “[a]n average audience would not do
a better job.” Id.
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applicable provisions.97  First, the court looked to the placement of sound
recordings in § 102’s recognition of copyrightable subject matter.98  Section
102 simply places sound recordings as one of eight enumerated copyright-
able categories, and therefore does not afford special treatment or suggest
sound recordings should be subject to different levels of protection than the
other enumerated categories.99  The court came to a similar conclusion
regarding § 101’s “neutrally worded” definition of sound recordings100—the
definition is silent on the de minimis exception and does not suggest Con-
gress intended to preclude its application.101  Further, the court claimed,
§ 106 fails to evince an intention by Congress to alter the common law’s
effect on sound recordings or to otherwise treat them differently than other
categories of copyrightable works.102  While § 106(6) does grant an addi-
tional exclusive right specifically to sound recording copyrights, that right
concerns public performances and thus does not impact any rights associated
with copying.103  Therefore, nothing in the basic provisions setting out the
rights enjoyed by copyright holders supports treating sound recording copy-
rights any differently than any other category.  Sound recordings are treated
distinctly in § 114, however, but the court does not consider that section to
defeat the de minimis exception.  The role of that section in Title 17 is to
impose limits on the rights enumerated in § 106, and eliminating the de
minimis defense would expand those rights.104  The structure of the copy-
right laws thus militates against eliminating the de minimis exception.
The court’s conception of losing the de minimis defense as expanding
the rights of the copyright holder also dictates its plain reading of § 114.
Much like the Bridgeport court, VMG argued that the independent fixation
exception in § 114(b) effectively supplants the de minimis exception and
grants a sound recording copyright holder the exclusive right to sample his
own work.105  Denying this interpretation, the VMG court placed great
97 The court’s statutory interpretation is primarily cast in the shadow of its conviction
that “[t]he rule that infringement occurs only when a substantial portion is copied is firmly
established in the law.” Id.  The court found the Nimmer treatise’s trace of the rule to the
mid-1800s particularly persuasive in this regard and traced its own express recognition of
the rule to at least 1977. See id. at 880–81 (first citing NIMMER, supra note 60,
§ 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-56 to 13-57, 13-57 n.102; and then citing Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)).  Quoting
Krofft, the court derived the rule from the fact that the copyright holder’s “legally pro-
tected interest [is] the potential financial return from his compositions which derive from
the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.” Id. at 881 (alteration in original) (quoting
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165).  With the presumption that the de minimis exception ubiqui-
tously applies across all of copyright law, the court then turned to its statutory analysis.
98 VMG, 824 F.3d at 881–82.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 882.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 883.
105 See id. at 882–83.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 16 31-MAY-18 11:29
1714 notre dame law review [vol. 93:4
emphasis on the phrasing of the exception—“[t]he exclusive rights of the
owner of a copyright in a sound recording . . . do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording [with certain qualities].”106  The
court rightly interpreted this to mean that any mimicking of a sound record-
ing, even if perfect, does not infringe the copyright so long as the there is no
actual copying.107  But the Ninth Circuit did not consider this to address the
question presented, that is, whether Congress intended to preclude the de
minimis defense where the sample sounds markedly dissimilar to the origi-
nal.108  Rather, the independent fixation exception is an express limitation
on the boundaries of the copyright, and as such, does not carry an implicit
expansion of rights, particularly against the backdrop of the “consistent
application of the de minimis exception across centuries of jurispru-
dence.”109  The court, with reliance on the Nimmer treatise, goes so far as to
state that Bridgeport therefore “rests on a logical fallacy”110: it cannot be
inferred that because the exclusive right does not extend to a particular cir-
cumstance, it therefore does extend to all others.111  The plain language of
§ 114 and its logical consequences thus do not support Bridgeport’s holding.
The court lastly turned to the pertinent legislative history to support its
position that not only should courts not treat sound recordings any differ-
ently from the other categories, but Congress affirmatively intended to retain
the de minimis defense.112  The court specifically looked to a House Report
explaining that, while § 114(b) limits statutory protection to the particular
sounds of the recording and thus allows for independently fixed imitations,
“infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual
sounds . . . are reproduced.”113  By this language, Congress intended to
retain the same infringement standard in sound recordings as with any other
category.  Rather than carve out an exception that also precludes the tradi-
tional common law defense, Congress “clearly understood that the de
minimis exception applies to copyrighted sound recordings.”114  Congres-
sional intent thus confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute.
VMG’s recognition of the de minimis defense, much like Bridgeport’s
rejection, hinged on an interpretation of Title 17.  Its reading of the statutory
scheme evinced an intent to treat sound recordings exactly as other copy-
rightable works and to impose limitations through § 114.  The plain text of
§ 114 limits protection to only the actual sounds embodied in the recording;
only by logical fallacy could one conclude that this limitation expanded the
106 Id. at 883 (second alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012)).  The
court also noted that all of the other sentences in § 114(b) use the same “do not extend”
or “do not apply” language to limit the scope of the sound recording copyright.  Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 884 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 60, § 13.03[A][2][b], at 13-61).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 883.
113 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976)).
114 Id. at 884.
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rights to preclude the de minimis defense, and the legislative history of the
1976 Act confirmed Congress’s intent to require a showing of more than de
minimis copying. VMG took the right analytical approach, but it erred in its
reasoning.  Part III will largely argue within this framework, but will argue in
favor of Bridgeport’s holding.
III. THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE SHOULD NOT APPLY TO INFRINGEMENT OF
SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHTS
Bridgeport reached the right conclusion, but should have gone further in
its analysis—likewise, VMG considered many of the right factors but drew a
conclusion contrary to what those factors demonstrated.  This Part will argue
in favor of rejecting the de minimis defense to infringement of sound record-
ing copyrights based on two elements: (1) the legislative history of the Sound
Recording Act and the 1976 Act evinces a policy inconsistent with traditional
principles of copyright law and thus demands a unique approach to sound
recording copyrights, and (2) the plain text of § 114, read in light of the
legislative history, precludes the de minimis defense.
A. Legislative History Rebuts the Traditional Policies Behind the De Minimis
Defense
The VMG court properly looked to legislative history to inform its inter-
pretation of § 114. VMG’s underinclusive analysis, however, failed to uncover
the myriad passages throughout the history of the SRA and the 1976 Act that
emphasize the need to adequately compensate and reward artists and pro-
ducers for their work, protect the integrity of the sound recording itself, and
deter others from freeriding on the labor that goes into creating a sound
recording.
Congress, as explained in Section I.A, was principally motivated by the
widespread record piracy in the years leading up to the SRA.  Emphasizing
the exigency of the issue, the House Report estimated “that the annual vol-
ume of [record] piracy [was] in excess of $100 million.”115  In contrast, the
annual value of legitimate record sales was estimated at $300 million.116  The
rampant piracy imparted substantial economic harm on legitimate record
manufacturers, but of “equal importance” to Congress was the denial of roy-
alties to performing artists and musicians.117  Prominent in the SRA’s legisla-
tive history is this type of focus on the extraeconomic impact of piracy and
infringement on the integrity of artists, musicians, engineers, producers, and
other players responsible for the creation of the copyrighted work.118  Con-
115 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 481 (1967) (statement of Thurman
Arnold, Special Counsel, Record Indus. Ass’n of Am.) (noting, during hearings on a previ-
ous iteration of the bill the SRA derived from, the House committee’s emphasis on the
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gress was concerned not just with the fact that pirates were preventing those
responsible for a sound recording from adequate financial compensation,
but with the fact that pirates were in essence stealing their “efforts” and “tal-
ent.”119  The integrity of the sound recording itself, and the labor and skill it
represents, drove the legislature to protect those creative works.
The independent fixation exception reflects this motivation by focusing
protection on the form of the recording’s content rather than its substance.
Allowing perfect imitation of sound recordings demonstrates that § 114(b)
only intends to punish unauthorized uses of the sounds as fixed by the original
creator.120  The substance of those sounds does not matter—if the substance
mattered, Congress would not have allowed for perfect imitation.  What mat-
ters is the original (and any subsequently authorized) embodiment of the
sounds––that is, the actual product of the artist’s labor.  For this reason, the
traditional policy concerns behind copyright law, and particularly behind the
de minimis defense, carry little if any weight with sound recording
copyrights.
The economic incentive theory that pervades copyright law jurispru-
dence121 struggles to coexist with § 114’s allowance of perfect imitations122
and cannot account for Congress’s focus on the integrity of the artist’s work.
The independent fixation exception severely limits the economic value of
sound recordings and thus the prospect of gaining a sound recording copy-
right does not provide a substantial incentive to create new works.  While
§ 114 focuses on the form of the artist’s work, the substance of that work is
what carries economic value.  To the copyright holder, consumers are buying
“creativity and value of the contribution of performers and record producers to sound
recordings” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 94 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 6 (1971) (rejecting a compulsory license scheme for sound
recordings and emphasizing that the recording is the product of “the efforts of the record
company and the artists,” and that copyists, thus, may either find a license or “mak[e] the
same investment in production and talent as . . . the authorized record companies”).
119 See S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 6.
120 See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
121 Congress’s power to enact the copyright laws derives from the Progress Clause of
Article I of the Constitution: “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Courts tend to interpret this clause as intending to provide an economic incentive for
“authors and inventors” to “advance public welfare through [their] talents . . . in ‘Science
and useful Arts.’” See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)); see also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).
122 This is not to say that preventing economic harm was absent from the legislative
history.  For instance, Congress did not intend for the SRA to impose liability for unautho-
rized home recordings provided they were “for private use and with no purpose of repro-
ducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on [them].” H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7
(1971).
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sound recordings; but to the consumer, they are buying songs.  The value to
the consumer, the thing the consumer consumes, is the substance of the
work.  In other words, it is the underlying musical work copyright—as that
copyright actually protects the song—that provides the primary economic
value to the artist, not the sound recording copyright.  The sound recording
copyright acts as an additional protection to that underlying work, but as
such still does not independently carry a substantial creation incentive.  The
creation incentive associated with sound recordings derives from the copy-
right on the underlying musical work.
The de minimis defense derives from the same economic incentive the-
ory and therefore should not apply to sound recordings.  As the VMG court
explained, the defense is designed to protect the artist’s financial interest in
the “lay public’s approbation of his efforts.”123  Thus, the public’s recogni-
tion of the work determines liability.  But the form/substance distinction
between sound recordings and musical works means this cannot properly
map onto unauthorized reproductions or adaptations of sound recordings.
When a copyist directly recaptures the sounds fixed in the recording and uses
them in his own work, the object of the “lay public’s approbation” is the
substance of the underlying musical work.  Yes, the lay public hears the
recording, insofar as that is where the sound derives from, but what the lay
public listens to is the song and the sounds that embody the musical work.
The de minimis inquiry is therefore not fit for the form protected by the
sound recording copyright because its object is the substance protected by
the underlying musical work copyright.
An examination of the compulsory license scheme for musical works fur-
ther supports this conceptual divide between the two types of protection.
The current compulsory license provisions in § 115 provide a “cover” license
whereby anyone may “make and distribute phonorecords of” a musical work
previously distributed to the public.124  The modern § 115 in turn derives
from § 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”),125 Congress’s first
enactment of a statutory license.  Because the 1909 Act did not recognize
sound recordings as copyrightable subject matter, § 1(e) is silent on that mat-
ter, instead providing substantially the same protections as § 115—anyone
could mechanically reproduce a previously publicly distributed musical com-
position upon payment of a statutory royalty.126  Instead of silence, however,
§ 115 expressly excludes sound recordings from the compulsory scheme.127
123 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir.
1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012).  This often takes the form of one recording artist
recording another artist’s song in his own style. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 413–14 (4th ed. 2015); see also supra note 36.
125 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76.
126 Id. at 1076.
127 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1).
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The legislative history suggests a Lockean labor theory rationale rather
than the expected economic incentive argument.  Congress first squarely
rejected the compulsory license for sound recordings when developing the
SRA.  Presented with the argument that a sound recording statutory license
would be “an appropriate adjunct” to the musical work license, the Senate
Report declined to equate the two: the mechanical license for musical works
affords “the right to make use of raw material—in this instance a copyrighted
song.  The record label, the performing artist, musicians, and arrangers
develop this song into the finished product—the recorded song.”128  Using
my proposed parlance, the mechanical license runs only to the substance, the
“raw material,” that is then shaped and embodied in the form resultant of the
parties’ labor.  That finished product, that form, is not just a marketable com-
modity made for consumers, but rather represents the “efforts of the record
company and the artists” and therefore should not be made available to copy-
ists without their consent.129  The Senate Report even went so far as to make
a prototypical “get a license or do not sample” statement: “Any unauthorized
manufacturer who wishes to produce a record containing the same songs
may do so by paying the mechanical royalty and making the same investment
in production and talent as is being done by the authorized record compa-
nies.”130  All of these statements focus explicitly on “talent” and “effort.”  The
Senate Report’s rejection of the compulsory license for sound recordings
nowhere mentions any economic argument.
The accompanying House Report131 echoes the same sentiments.  After
first incorporating the rationale of the Senate Report, the House Report pro-
ceeds to incorporate the reports of the Librarian of Congress and the Depart-
ments of State, Justice, and Commerce to further support the SRA.132  Of the
four statements, only the Department of Commerce spoke directly to the
compulsory license issue.  While noting that allowing the license would not
“eliminate the undesirable effects” of piracy,133 the main force of the state-
ment’s support of Congress’s decision centered on the fact that “[s]ound
recordings are finished products embodying the efforts of performers and
recording companies.”134  Forcing sound recording copyright holders to
128 S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 6 (1971).
129 Id. (“The committee sees no justification for the granting of a compulsory license to
copy the finished product, which has been developed and promoted through the efforts of
the record company and the artists.” (emphasis added)).
130 Id.
131 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971).
132 Id. at 9–16.
133 Id. at 15.  Though the statement does not elaborate on this point, presumably the
license would not prevent the piracy concerns because unless the statutory royalty was pro-
hibitively high, the royalty would just be a negligible cost to pirates.  Recall that piracy was
at a market volume of nearly $100 million, see supra text accompanying note 115, so the
two-cent statutory royalty for musical works posed only a nominal barrier.  The same
would, in theory, hold true for a sound recording royalty.
134 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 15.
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comply with the compulsory license would therefore be “inequitable.”135
Congress’s stance with the SRA was thus clear: there was no problem with
statutorily inhibiting a musical work copyright holder’s right to exclude
others, but sound recording copyrights were to be licensed exclusively at the
will of the copyright holder.
The House Report’s comments on § 115 in the 1976 Act’s history com-
ports with this reading as well.  While the statute on its face contemplates that
sound recordings are excluded from the license and require authorization
from the actual copyright holder, the House Report strengthens this by clari-
fying that sound recording copyright holders are not “in any way
require[d] . . . to grant a license to duplicate the original sound record-
ing.”136  Therefore, under the 1976 Act as under the SRA, Congress seems to
have intended that musical work copyrights be subject to third-party control
in certain situations while sound recording copyrights were to be controlled
exclusively by the rights holder.  To push the implication further, Congress
here marked a clear instance where musical work and sound recording copy-
rights were subject to dramatically different levels of protection.  It is with
this full legislative history that we should now read the language of § 114.
B. The Plain Text of the Statute, in Light of the Legislative History, Is
Incompatible with the De Minimis Defense
As evidenced by the contrary interpretations of the Bridgeport and VMG
courts, the plain language of § 114 alone is not dispositive here.  Rather, the
proper reading of the statute must be done in light of the full weight of the
legislative history.  Taking this into account, § 114 supplants the common law
de minimis defense by providing an exclusive statutory defense: independent
fixation.  Both Bridgeport and VMG correctly construed the exception as
allowing for perfect mimicry of the sound recording, provided that the copy-
ist independently fixes the sounds.  While VMG accurately characterized this
as a limitation, it erred in concluding that reading it as a rejection of the de
minimis defense would expand the rights of the copyright holder beyond the
bounds of Title 17.  This conclusion fails because it ignores the function of
§ 114, and particularly § 114(b), within Title 17.
Recall the basic statutory scheme: § 102 defines copyrightable subject
matter; § 106 defines the broad set of exclusive rights afforded to those cate-
gories subject to the provisions in §§ 107–122; § 114 limits § 106 by defining the
“scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings”;137 § 114(a) limits sound
recordings to the rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and public
performance via digital audio transmission; and § 114(b) limits the reproduc-
tion and adaptation rights to the actual sounds fixed in the recording,
expressly excluding from this protection independently fixed imitations.
The function of § 114 is to draw the only boundaries around the § 106 rights
135 Id.
136 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 108–09 (1976).
137 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
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afforded to sound recordings—a purely statutory creature not recognized
until 1971138—and those boundaries cover only the actual sounds fixed in
the recording.  Section 114, the only section tasked with drawing those
boundaries, makes an express recognition of only one defense to infringe-
ment of the reproduction and adaptation rights.
The VMG court declined to “read an implicit expansion of rights into Con-
gress’ statement of an express limitation on rights,”139 but there is no implicit
expansion of rights here; § 114 adopted nearly whole cloth the SRA, which
itself created the rights afforded to sound recording copyrights.  The 1976 Act
could not expand the rights of a centuries-old common-law doctrine because
it was merely incorporating the five-year-old statutory creature that
originated with the SRA in the first place.140  The centuries-old pronounce-
ment that does carry force, however, is the Supreme Court’s 1834 decision in
Wheaton v. Peters:
[Copyright], as has been shown, does not exist at common law—it
originated, if at all, under the acts of congress.  No one can deny that when
the legislature are [sic] about to vest an exclusive right in an author or an
inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall
be enjoyed; and that no one can avail himself of such right who does not substantially
comply with the requisitions of the law.141
This thing, the sound recording copyright, created purely by legislation
and not by the courts, is given one defense, and that therefore is the singular
defense.142  Just as sound recording copyright holders are given exclusive
control in the compulsory license context, they should retain exclusive con-
trol in the § 114 context.  If the alleged copy does not consist entirely of
independently fixed sounds as required by the statute, it necessarily falls
within the ambit of the exclusive rights retained by the copyright holder.
The VMG court treated sound recordings like any other copyrightable
subject matter but in doing so failed to appreciate the unique properties of
sound recordings created by § 114.  Sound recordings cannot be analogized
to photographs or sculptures or drawings or books because those other cate-
gories do not carry the same unique exception to infringement.  No provi-
sion in Title 17 provides that a copyist may, without authorization, lawfully
138 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
139 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 2016).
140 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
141 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663–64 (1834) (emphasis added).  Explain-
ing that copyright “is a creature of statute,” the Ninth Circuit also relied on this passage in
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). See
also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) (citing this passage with approval when explaining
the 1909 Act’s creation of a compulsory license scheme for musical works, stating that
“Congress could not legislate a man’s existing rights out of existence . . . but in this case
Congress is creating a new property right”).
142 Fair use would still be a viable defense.  Section 106 subjects all copyrightable sub-
ject matter to the various limitations in §§ 107–122, so both § 107 and § 114 impact sound
recording copyrights.  Nothing in § 107 suggests it does not extend to sound recordings,
and nothing in § 114 suggests other express statutory limitations would not apply.
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copy a painting if he paints the copy himself, or copy a book if he writes it
himself, or copy a sculpture if he sculpts it himself.  No other provision of
Title 17 allows a copyist to lawfully copy the entirety of the copyrighted work so
long as he does not take directly from the original work.143  The language of
the statute and the weight of its history demand differential treatment of
sound recordings.  While VMG cites to the House Report language indicating
an intent to require a substantial similarity analysis, that one line neither
comports with the ultimate legislative effect of the statute nor overcomes the
pervasive emphasis on the integrity of the copyright holder’s work.144  The
operation of § 114(b) precludes the de minimis defense.
To summarize, the de minimis defense should not be available for the
infringement of sound recording copyrights because the plain text of § 114
precludes it, and the purpose and policy behind the statute make traditional
copyright policy irrelevant in the case of sound recordings.  First, the legisla-
tive history of the SRA and the 1976 Act strongly suggests that § 114 really
protects the integrity of the form of the sound recording rather than the
substance embodied by that form.  Because the traditional economic under-
pinnings of copyright law and the de minimis defense look to the substance
of the embodied work rather than its form, they cannot capture the unique
statutory nature of sound recordings.  Second, the statute defines the exclu-
sive boundaries of sound recording copyrights and provides independent fix-
ation as the one singular defense to infringement.  By specifically providing
only one defense in the section dedicated to defining the scope of the copy-
right, the statute requires reproductions and adaptations not within the
ambit of the defense to infringe the residuum of the exclusive right retained
by the copyright holder.  The de minimis defense should therefore not
apply.
CONCLUSION
Sound recording copyrights are unique creatures of statute.  The
Bridgeport court properly recognized this and declined to afford samplers the
common law de minimis defense.  Relying on the words deliberately chosen
by Congress to define the scope of the exclusive rights afforded to sound
143 For this reason, I take particular issue with VMG’s characterization of eliminating
the de minimis defense as expanding the copyright holder’s rights.  The independent fixa-
tion exception all but obliterates the worth of those rights.  A copyist may reproduce a
trivial amount of a painting and successfully assert the de minimis defense, but he cannot
take advantage of the defense beyond that trivial reproduction; in the sound recording
context, however, not only can a sampler reproduce a trivial amount of a recording, but he
can reproduce 100% of the recording and sell it as his own, provided he independently
fixes the sounds (and, of course, clears the use of the underlying musical work).  There is
no expansion of rights when a perfect simulation of the work is lawful.
144 Additionally, the “all or any substantial portion” language cited by VMG did not
appear until much later in the history. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 65 (1967) (“Thus,
infringement takes place whenever the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
sound recording are reproduced . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 94 (1966) (same).
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recordings and weighing the attendant policy concerns, the court established
a bright-line rule: “get a license or do not sample.”145  Looking also to the
statute but considering further the legislative history behind those words, the
VMG court held to the contrary and divided two centers of the American
music industry into conflicting protection regimes.  The split must be
resolved, and absent congressional action, it should be resolved in favor of
Bridgeport.
This is not a clear case. VMG’s insistence on treating sound recordings
just as every other copyrightable subject matter relies on the fundamental
theories that drive the American copyright system and even finds compelling
support in the statute’s legislative history.  But the court’s application of
those principles was inconsistent with the unique statutory nature of sound
recordings, and its underinclusive analysis of the legislative history painted
only a tinted portion of the copyright’s greater portrait.146  This is not to say
that Bridgeport’s analysis was pristine—it was not. VMG rightly criticized
Bridgeport not only for ignoring the legislative history, but also for dedicating
too much of its analysis to the reasons its rule is just rather than the reasons
its rule is required.147  But the justness of the bright-line rule is beyond the
scope of this Note.  Rather, this Note set out to show only that Bridgeport
reached the right conclusion.  The words of the statute, the nature of the
protection, and the effect of the protection demand a rejection of the de
minimis defense to infringement of sound recording copyrights.  Section 114
dictates this result.
Here, the bright line is the right line: “get a license or do not sample.”148
145 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
146 VMG, for instance, criticized Bridgeport’s physical/intellectual taking distinction as
advancing a “sweat of the brow” argument, but this fails to account for the numerous refer-
ences in the legislative history to the importance of the artist’s efforts and talents. See VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991)).
147 Id.
148 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
